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THE POLITICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
DRINKING AGE LAW
COMMENT BY
Lu ANN SNIDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, accidents on Florida's highways totaled 237,511.1 Six-
teen percent of these accidents were alcohol-related.2 Of the 2,856
fatalities on Florida's highways, forty-seven percent were alcohol-
related.3 Nationwide statistics also indicate that approximately
fifty percent of all highway deaths involve the use of alcohol.4
The magnitude of the problem of drunk driving has become the
source of much public concern, media attention, and political ac-
tivity. In 1982, in response to public demand, a Presidential Com-
mission was formed to study the problem of drunk driving.5 In
Florida, a Task Force on Dram Shop Responsibility, appointed by
the Governor's Highway Safety Council, recently studied problems
relating to drunk driving.' Groups such as Mothers Against Drunk
Drivers (MADD) and Students Against Drunk Drivers (SADD)
have done much to bring the problem before the public eye.
During the 1985 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature re-
sponded to concerns about the problem of drunk driving by pass-
ing Senate Bill 1, which increased the minimum legal drinking age
from nineteen to twenty-one.7 This Comment traces the drinking
age bills considered by the legislature and analyzes key provisions
of the new law.
II. PRIOR STATE OF THE LAW
During the early 1970's, twenty-nine states lowered their mini-
mum legal drinking age, generally from twenty-one to eighteen.8 In
*Candidate for the degree Juris Doctor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. DEP'T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, FLORIDA TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACrS
(1984) (available at Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Tallahassee, Fla.).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 130 CONG. REC. S8207 (June 26, 1984) (comments of Sen. Danforth).
5. See AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE NATION FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON DRUNK
DRIVING (Dec. 13, 1982).
6. See Gov.'s TASK FORCE ON DRAM SHOP RESPONSIBILITY, FINAL REPORT (Mar. 1, 1985)
(available at Governor's Highway Safety Council Offices, Tallahassee, Fla.).
7. Ch. Law 85-285, 1985 Fla. Laws 1769 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 322.141, 561.15,
562.11, 562.111, 562.51).
8. A. WILLIAMS, P. ZADOR, S. HARRIS & R. KARPF, THE EFFECr OF RAISING THE LEGAL
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1973, Florida joined these states by lowering its drinking age to
eighteen.' Several social factors touched off this wave of reductions
in the legal drinking age.10 Large numbers of men younger than the
age of twenty-one were being drafted by the military to serve in
the Vietnam War.11 The intellectual community supported a lower
minimum drinking age, arguing that the change would merely le-
gitimize existing behavior. 12 Additionally, in 1971 the twenty-sixth
amendment was passed, giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote
in national elections.1 " These factors brought abstract issues of the
legal rights of eighteen to twenty-year-olds to the forefront of de-
bate on the minimum drinking age. It seemed only logical to ex-
tend to those persons who had adult rights and responsibilities the
privilege of purchasing alcohol.
By 1980, however, public attention shifted to the more prag-
matic concern of stemming the tide of alcohol-related traffic acci-
dents. 14 Some fourteen states had raised their minimum legal
drinking age by 1981,'" including Florida, which raised the drink-
ing age to nineteen in 1980.8
Prior to July 1, 1985, Florida law provided that selling, giving,
serving or permitting to be served alcoholic beverages to a person
under nineteen, or the possession of alcoholic beverages by one
under the age of nineteen constituted a second degree misde-
meanor.' 7 Additionally, beverage licensees were required to be at
least nineteen years of age. 18 A statutory exception allowed any
person on active duty in the armed forces of the United States
eighteen or older to purchase alcoholic beverages.' 9 Persons eigh-
teen or older who were employed by certain beverage vendors were
exempted from the provision regarding possession of alcoholic bev-
MINIMUM DRINKING AGE ON FATAL CRASH INVOLVEMENT (1981) (available from Insurance In-
stitute for Highway Safety, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as A. WILLIAMS].
9. Ch. 73-334, § 49, 1973 Fla. Laws 906, 956.
10. Douglass, The Legal Age and Traffic Casualties: A Special Case of Changing Alco-
hol Availability in a Public Health Context, in MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS 93, 93 (H.
Wechsler ed. 1980).
11. Id. at 93-94.
12. Mosher, The History of Youthful-Drinking Laws: Implications for Current Policy,
in MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS 11, 11 (H. Wechsler ed. 1980).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. A. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 1.
16. Act of June 9, 1980, Ch. 80-74, 1980 Fla. Laws 254.
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 562.11(I)(b), (2) (1983).
18. FLA. STAT. § 561.15(1) (1983).
19. FLA. STAT. § 562.113 (1983).
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erages in the course of their employment."
Legislative attempts over the past several years to raise Florida's
minimum drinking age to twenty-one had failed to gain the neces-
sary support to succeed. 21 While supporters of an increased drink-
ing age argued that the number of alcohol-related traffic fatalities
necessitated such a change,22 opponents countered that drivers
under the age of twenty-one are no more blameworthy than any
other age group.23
In 1984, however, Congress enacted legislation which encouraged
the states to increase their minimum drinking ages. 24 The Act con-
tains a provision which requires the Secretary of Transportation to
withhold five percent of a state's federal highway funds under the
primary, secondary, interstate, and urban construction programs
for fiscal year 1987 if the state fails to establish, by October 1,
1986, a minimum age of twenty-one for the purchase or public pos-
session of alcoholic beverages. Ten percent of a state's federal
highway funds will be withheld for fiscal year 1988 if the state fails
to adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-one by October 1,
1987. Any funds withheld will be retroactively apportioned to the
state if it establishes twenty-one as the minimum drinking age in
any succeeding fiscal year.25 Florida would suffer an estimated loss
of $81.5 million in federal highway funds for the two-year period if
the drinking age were not raised to twenty-one.2 6 The federal law
also provides incentive grants to any state which adopts programs
specifying mandatory jail terms and license suspensions for per-
sons convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol.
20. FLA. STAT. § 562.13 (1983).
21. Tallahassee Democrat, May 18, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
22. 21 or Else Mandate Angers States, STATE GOVERNMENT NEWS 4, 10 (Aug. 1984).
23. Id.
24. Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, §§ 6-7, 98 Stat. 435, 437-39 (to be codified
at 23 U.S.C. §§ 158, 408).
25. Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 6, 98 Stat. 435, 437.
26. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., CS for SB 1 (1985) Staff Analysis 2 (final June 10,
1985) (on file with committee).
27. Any state is eligible for a special grant not to exceed 5% of the amount apportioned
to the state for the fiscal year 1984 if the state enacts a statute which provides:
(A) Any person convicted of a first violation of driving under the influence of alco-
hol shall receive-
(i) a mandatory license suspension for a period of not less than ninety days; and
either
(ii)(1) an assignment of one hundred hours of community service; or
(II) a minimum sentence of imprisonment for forty-eight consecutive hours;
(B) any person convicted of a second violation of driving under the influence of
alcohol within five years after a conviction for the same offense, shall receive a
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 54, which proposed raising the legal
drinking age to twenty-one, were introduced during the 1985 Regu-
lar Session.28 The bills also proposed raising from nineteen to
twenty-one the age at which one may obtain a liquor license.29 The
original Senate and House bills differed primarily in two respects.
The House bill contained a "grandfather" provision that would ex-
empt persons born on or before September 30, 1965, from the min-
imum drinking age provision."0 This provision would have allowed
persons who were twenty by September 30, 1985, the effective date
of the legislation, to continue to purchase alcohol. Further, the
House bill would have removed the existing exemption from the
minimum drinking age for military personnel on active duty.-1 The
Senate bill contained neither of these provisions.
The difficulties that the drinking age bills would encounter dur-
ing the session became apparent after the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee, the first committee to consider the Senate bill, substan-
tially altered it.32  The first change incorporated a broad
grandfather provision which would have allowed anyone nineteen
or older by September 30, 1986 to continue to purchase alcoholic
beverages. Supporters of the provision were concerned about dis-
enfranchising persons currently allowed to purchase alcohol who
would not be able to do so under the new law. Opponents argued
that the provision would not comply with the federal legislation
and would thus cause Florida to lose a portion of its federal high-
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for ten days and license revoca-
tion for not less than one year;
(C) any person convicted of a third or subsequent violation of driving under the
influence of alcohol within five years after a prior conviction for the same offense
shall-
(i) receive a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for one hundred and
twenty days; and
(ii) have his license revoked for not less than three years- .
28. Fla. SB 1 (1985), sponsored by Sens. Don Childers, Dem., W. Palm Beach, and Pat
Neal, Dem., Bradenton; Fla. HB 54 (1985), sponsored by Rep. Fran Carlton, Dem., Orlando,
and others (for complete list of sponsors, see FLA. H. JOUR. 13 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 2, 1985)).
29. Fla. SB 1, sec. 1 (1985); Fla. HB 54, sec. 1 (1985).
30. Fla. HB 54, sec. 5 (1985).
31. Id. sec. 4. Other differences in the bills included: SB 1 contained a provision requir-
ing all drivers licenses issued to persons under the age of 21 to have a photographic back-
drop of a different color from all other drivers licenses. HB 54 provided that no beverage
license issued prior to the change in law to a person under the age of 21 would be revoked
by virtue of the licensee's age.
32. Fla. CS for SB 1 (1985).
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way funds.
A far more controversial change in the Senate bill was the addi-
tion of an antidiscrimination provision. The provision, offered by
Senator Jack Gordon, 34 denied to any person, firm, or corporation
licensed under Florida's beverage laws the right to "withhold mem-
bership, its facilities, or services to any person on account of race,
religion, sex, or national origin, except such organizations which
are oriented to a particular religion or which are ethnic in charac-
ter."" Although opponents denounced the Gordon amendment as
an attempt to kill the bill, the amendment passed the Commerce
Committee by an 11-0 vote. 6
Resentment over the tactics employed by the federal govern-
ment to persuade states to adopt a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one prompted the Senate Commerce Committee to adopt a
"court of last resort" amendment." The amendment provided that
if a court of last resort should hold the federal legislation which
would withhold highway funds unconstitutional, any change in
Florida's drinking age would be repealed.38
The Senate bill was further altered by the Senate Committee on
Finance, Taxation and Claims.3 0 In an effort to appease certain or-
ganizations, such as the Moose and Elks clubs, which would have
been affected by the antidiscrimination provision, Senator W.D.
Childers40 offered an amendment exempting any "nationally recog-
nized fraternal organization which by its nature is all of one gen-
der.' 1 Committee members stated that the antidiscrimination
amendment was intended to affect private clubs and not fraternal
organizations. 42 In addition, the Committee added provisions to re-
peal the military exemption and limit the grandfather provision to
33. Fla. S. Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 8, 1985) (on file with
committee). The amendment was offered by Sen. Timothy Deratany, Repub., Indiatlantic.
34. Dem., Miami Beach.
35. Fla. CS for SB 1, sec. 7 (1985).
36. Fla. S. Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 8, 1985) (on file with
committee).
37. Id.; see Fla. CS for SB 1, sec. 8 (1985).
38. Fla. CS for SB 1, sec. 8 (1985). A further change adopted by the Senate Comm. on
Com. provided an increased penalty for the selling of alcholic beverages to a minor by a
licensee and added a $10 thousand penalty for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to sell by the licensee or his employee.
39. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1 (1985).
40. Dem., Pensacola.
41. Fla. S., Comm. on Fin. & Tax, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 10, 1985) (amend-
ment by Sen. Childers) (on file with committee).
42. Fla. S., Comm. on Fin., Tax. & Claims, tape recording of proceedings (May 8, 1985)
(on file with committee).
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those persons twenty years or older on September 30, 1985."' An-
other amendment was added to provide that a license issued prior
to the change in law to anyone under the age of twenty-one would
not be revoked.'4
The House drinking age bill also encountered problems. The
House Committee on Regulated Industries and Licensing amended
the original House bill to remove the repeal of the military exemp-
tion and increase the civil penalty against a licensee for selling al-
cohol to a minor.45 Additionally, the Committee eliminated the
grandfather provision and made the effective date of the Act Sep-
tember 30, 1986. However, the next Committee to consider House
Bill 54, the House Finance and Taxation Committee, reinstated
both the grandfather provision and the provision eliminating the
military exemption.'6
When the bill reached the House Appropriations Committee, the
Committee considered two of the amendments previously added to
the Senate drinking age bill. The Committee adopted an antidis-
crimination amendment which was identical to Senator Gordon's
amendment to Senate Bill 1.47 Additionally, the Committee added
a "court of last resort" amendment. 48 The Committee also changed
the definition of "legal age" to include anyone nineteen years or
older on September 30, 1986, thus allowing anyone who could le-
gally purchase alcohol prior to the change in law to continue to do
SO. 49
The drinking age bills encountered more difficulty upon reaching
the floor of each chamber. On first reading of House Bill 54, the
House rejected the Senate's antidiscrimination amendment and
adopted its own version which provided, "Licensed retail alcoholic
beverage establishments open to the public are private enterprises
and may refuse service to any person who is objectionable or unde-
sirable to the licensee, but such right to refuse service shall not be
43. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1 (1985).
44. Id.
45. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Reg'd Indus. & Lic., HB 54 (1985) Staff Analysis 2 (Apr.
4, 1985) (on file with committee). The committee also adopted a provision, similar to an
amendment to SB 1, to increase the penalty for selling alcohol to a minor by a licensee and
to impose a $10 thousand fine for possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell by
the licensee or an employee.
46. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Fin., Tax. & Claims, CS for HB 54 (1985) Fiscal Note
(Apr. 9, 1985) (on file with committee).
47. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm on Approp., CS for HB 54 Fiscal Note (Apr. 26, 1985) (on
file with committee).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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in violation of s. 2, Art. I of the State Constitution." 50 Additionally,
the full House rejected the court of last resort amendment and the
provision increasing civil penalties for licensees who violated the
beverage laws.51
Before the Senate drinking age bill passed out of that chamber,
the Senate rejected the court of last resort amendment. 52 However,
upon reconsideration, the amendment was adopted by a 20-19
vote. 3 Upon motion by Senator Dempsey Barron,54 the Senate re-
instated the exemption for certain military personnel.55 The Sen-
ate also considered, but rejected, an amendment providing for an
annual survey to establish which age group had the highest per-
centage of alcohol-related traffic fatalities and prohibiting anyone
in that age group from possessing alcoholic beverages for one
year.56 A proposed amendment which would have established a
study commission on government-abetted discrimination was also
rejected.57
The Senate twice sent its version of the bill to the House.58 The
House rejected it both times, reinstated the weaker antidiscrimina-
tion amendment, and returned it to the Senate.59 Ultimately,
House and Senate sponsors of the bill succeeded in forcing it into a
conference committee. 60 The resulting recommendation of the
Conference Committee reflected compromises on key issues."1
First, the Conference Committee rejected the Senate's antidis-
crimination provision and adopted the weaker House provision.
Second, the conferees adopted the, Senate's court of last resort
amendment, but made it applicable only to federal courts. Third,
the Committee adopted a broad grandfather provision that allows
anyone who could legally purchase alcoholic beverages prior to the
50. FLA. H.R. JouR 388 (Reg. Sess. May 16, 1985).
51. Id. at 388-89.
52. FLA. S. JouR. 398-99 (Reg. Ses. May 23, 1985) (Amendment 2C).
53. Id. at 399.
54. Dem., Panama City.
55. Id.
56. Id. The amendment was offered by Sen. Gordon presumably in an attempt to point
out the arbitrariness of focusing on 19 and 21-year-olds rather than on empirical evidence of
which age groups contribute most to the problem of alcohol-related accidents. See Fla. S.,
tape recording of proceedings (May 23, 1985) (CS for CS for SB 1) (on file with Secretary).
57. FLA. S. JouR. 399-400 (Reg. Sess. May 23, 1985).
58. Id. at 400, 594-96 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1985).
59. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 716 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1985); id. at 829 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1985).
60. FLA. S. JOUR. 700 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 829 (Reg. Sess. May 29,
1985).
61. FLA. S. JOUR. 932 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985).
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enactment of the new law on July 1, 1985 to continue to do so.
Fourth, the report provided for severability: if any section of the
Act were determined to be unconstitutional by a Florida or federal
court, the validity or application of any other provision of the Act
should not be affected. Finally, the Conference Committee left in-
tact the military exemption.
Although Senate members protested the elimination of the
strong antidiscrimination provision, the Conference Committee's
report passed the Senate by a 31-6 vote.62 The report passed the
House by unanimous vote, 3 was signed by the Governor on June
20, 1985,64 and became effective July 1, 1985.65
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION
Ironically, the drinking age legislation may not accomplish the
two goals sought by its supporters; that is, to reduce the number of
alcohol-related traffic accidents on Florida's Highways and to en-
sure that Florida is not denied federal highway monies as a result
of noncompliance with federal law.
A. Effect on Alcohol-Related Traffic Accidents
Studies on the effect of raising the minimum drinking age on
accident statistics vary from reporting collision decreases of up to
seventy-five percent to reporting an increase in collisions.6" Oppo-
nents of an increased drinking age argue that such widely varying
statistics indicate that any projection of change in accident statis-
tics attributable to an increased drinking age is purely
speculative.67
One Florida study reported an overall increase in the number of
eighteen-year-old drivers involved in fatal accidents after Florida's
drinking age was raised to nineteen.68 The study indicated that the
number of eighteen-year-old drivers involved in fatal accidents in
62. Fla. S., tape recording of proceedings (May 30, 1985) (on file with Secretary); FLA. S.
JOUR. 932 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985).
63. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1039, 1041 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985).
64. Ch. 85-285, 1985 Fla. Laws 1798, 1801. Although Gov. Graham signed the drinking
age legislation, he protested the action of the federal government in withholding state high-
way funds, stating, "I don't think Congress ought to be imposing its will on the states on an
issue . . . that's traditionally been a state concern." Graham makes 21-year-old drinking
age the law in Florida, Tallahassee Democrat, June 24, 1985, at B15, col. 3.
65. Ch. 85-285, § 8, Fla. Laws 1769, 1801.
66. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
67. 130 CONG. REc. S8221 (June 26, 1984) (comments of Sen. Symms).
68. M. MORRIs, DRINKING-DRIVING BEHAVIOR IN FLORIDA, 1983 UPDATE (1985).
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Florida decreased for the first year after the change in the law.69
However, the number increased by forty-five percent from 1980 to
1983. During that period, the number of eighteen-year-old licensed
drivers decreased by ten thousand. 70
The most often cited study on the effect of raising the drinking
age is a survey prepared for the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety.7 ' The survey studied nine states which had increased the
minimum legal drinking age. The study concluded that any state
which raised its drinking age from eighteen to twenty-one could
expect a twenty-eight percent decline in nighttime fatal crashes of
drivers in that age group. 72 Of the nine states surveyed, eight ex-
perienced reductions in nighttime fatal crashes, the most frequent
of all alcohol-related crashes. 78 However, the reductions ranged
from six percent to seventy-five percent, and one of the nine states
actually experienced a fourteen percent increase in nighttime fatal
accidents.7 4 The study offered no explanation of the disparities in
the statistics.
A study involving a single state which lowered its drinking age
found no difference in the number of fatal collisions among young
drivers.7 5 Wisconsin, the study state, changed its drinking age law
from allowing eighteen to twenty-year-olds to purchase only beer
to making all alcoholic beverages available to that age group. The
study reported that eighteen to twenty-year-olds were not involved
in a significantly greater proportion of alcohol-related fatal colli-
sions after the change in the law.7 6 However, because beer was le-
gally available to that age group prior to the change in law, the
study is flawed. Inasmuch as beer is the most popular alcoholic
beverage among young people, making other alcoholic beverages
available to eighteen to twenty-year-olds is not likely to have a sig-
nificant effect on drinking behavior or accident statistics.77
Conversely, a single state study in Massachusetts, where the
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. A. WLLIAMS, supra note 8.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id. at table 4.
74. Id.
75. Noar & Nashold, Teenage Driver Fatalities Following Reduction in the Legal
Drinking Age, 7 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 74-79 (1975), cited in Whitehead, Research Stratagies
to Evaluate the Impact of Changes in the Legal Drinking Age, in MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE
LAWS 80 (H. Wechsler ed. 1980)).
76. Id.
77. Whitehead, supra note 75, at 80-81.
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drinking age was lowered to eighteen, found significant increases in
collisions following the change.78 Increases ranged from twenty-
four percent for collisions involving only property damage to sev-
enty-five percent for fatal accidents.7 9
The diversity in the findings of these studies is due in part to
the varying methodologies that each has employed. Additionally,
many circumstances may influence accident statistics.80 For exam-
ple, assessments of the condition of the driver may be subjective
and may inflate estimates of alcohol involvement.8 1 Measurements
of the blood alcohol level of drivers killed in collisions may be sub-
ject to greater inaccuracy than breath tests of live drivers.8 2 States
employ varying methods in collecting data regarding traffic acci-
dents.83 Enforcement policies regarding driving under the influence
may vary between teenagers and older drivers.8 4
The complexity of the issue suggests there may never be agree-
ment on the effect of Florida's increased drinking age on accident
statistics. Certainly any positive effect which may result from the
change will be limited so long as the grandfather provision is in
effect because nineteen and twenty-year-olds are still allowed to
purchase alcohol.
B. Compliance with Federal Law
Two provisions of the 1985 Florida Act, the grandfather clause
and the exemption of certain military personnel, potentially con-
flict with the federal legislation. It is arguable, therefore, that Flor-
ida is not in compliance with the federal law and thus will not be
entitled to its full apportionment of federal highway funds.
The Florida Act contains a declaration that the minimum legal
age for the possession or consumption of alcohol is twenty-one.8 5
However, the grandfather provision, allowing those who were
nineteen or twenty before July 1, 1985 to continue to drink, may
78. Cucchiaro, Ferreira, & Sicherman, The Effect of the 18-Year-Old Drinking Age on
Auto -Accidents (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Operations Research Center,
Working Paper 034-746, May 1974), cited in Whitehead, supra note 75, at 81.
79. Id.
80. Whitehead, supra note 75, at 81.
81. Id. at 74.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 75
84. R. Voas & J. Moulden, Historical Trends in Alcohol Use and Driving by Young
Americans, in MINIMUM-DRINKING-AGE LAWS 59, 69 (H. Wechsler ed. 1980).
85. Ch. 85-285, § 2, 1985 Fla. Laws 1798, 1799 (amending FLA. STAT. § 562.11(1)(a)
(1983)); id. § 3, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1800 (amending FLA. STAT § 562.111 (1983)).
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pose a problem. The federal law provides that funds shall be with-
held for any state "in which the purchase or public possession...
* of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one
years of age is lawful" after September 30, 1986.86 Therefore, Flor-
ida will not be in compliance as of October 1, 1986, the beginning
of the fiscal year. However, because those persons who were
ograndfathered in will reach age twenty-one by July 1, 1987, Florida
will be in compliance before the end of that fiscal year. This fact,
coupled with the provision authorizing retroactive apportionment
of federal funds to any state which subsequently complies with the
federal law, may permit Florida to receive its entire apportionment
of funds without any withholding. At worst, the grandfather provi-
sion may cause Florida a delay in receiving its full apportionment.
A more serious conflict with the federal legislation may lie in the
Florida Act's exemption for anyone on active duty in the military
who is eighteen or older. Although this affects only a small number
of persons, so long as this provision exists, Florida will not be in
compliance with the plain language of the federal statute. The fed-
eral Department of Transportation is currently promulgating
guidelines for implementing the federal legislation. Although they
are not yet available, these guidelines will assist in determining
compliance with federal law as well as how funds will be
processed.8 8 If it is determined that either the grandfather provi-
sion or the military exemption jeopardizes federal funding, the leg-
islature will have the opportunity to make the necessary changes
during the 1986 Regular Session and still meet the October 1, 1986
deadline imposed by the federal law.
C. Court of Last Resort Provision
As adopted, the Florida Act provides that should a federal court
of last resort determine that the federal government may not con-
stitutionally withhold funds from a state which does not raise its
drinking age to twenty-one, Florida's minimum drinking age will
revert to nineteen.8 9 To date, one state has challenged the federal
legislation on constitutional grounds.90 However, it does not appear
86. Pub. L. No. 98-363, § 6, 98 Stat. 435, 437.
87. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., CS for SB 1, Staff Analysis 3 (final June 10, 1985)
(on file with committee).
88. Id.
89. Ch. 85-285, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 1798, 1801 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 322.141).
90. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Reg. Indus. & Lic., HB 54 (1985) Staff Analysis 3 (rev.
Apr. 4, 1985) (on file with committee). South Dakota has challenged the federal legislation.
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likely that such a challenge will succeed.
The federal legislation is an exercise of the Congressional spend-
ing power.91 The Supreme Court has interpreted this power
broadly, noting that it "is quite expansive, particularly in view of
the enlargement of power by the Necessary and Proper Clause.'
92
One limitation on the spending power is that federal legislation
must promote the "general welfare."'93 However, Congress has
broad discretion in determining what constitutes the general wel-
fare." The intent of the legislation, which is to save lives and re-
duce injuries resulting from alcohol-related traffic accidents, 95 is
general in scope. Of particular concern to Congress was the prob-
lem of accidents resulting from teenagers' driving to and from
neighboring states with differing minimum drinking ages.9 This
would appear to make the establishment of a national minimum
drinking age of benefit to the general public.'
Although the federal legislation does not appear to violate the
"general welfare" provision, Congress, in exercising its spending
power, is limited by other constitutionally-imposed restraints.9
One basis of attack on the legislation might be that it violates the
twenty-first amendment.'8 Section 2 of that amendment, which re-
pealed prohibition, states: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv-
ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." 9 This language is susceptible to two
different interpretations.100 The first is that this section of the
amendment grants to the states exclusive regulatory power over
the use of alcohol within their borders. 0 1 However, even under this
interpretation, the federal legislation does not violate or change
South Dakota v. Dole, No. 84-5137 (D.S.D. dismissed May 3, 1985), appeal docketed, No.
85-5223-SD (8th Cir. June 26, 1985). Nine states have joined in a brief amicus curiae to the
Eight Circuit.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
92. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (per curiam).
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
94. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-91.
95. See 130 CONG. REc. S8206-07 (June 26, 1984) (comments of Sen. Danforth).
96. Id. at S8212 (comments of Sen. Heinz).
97. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 90-91.
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the laws of any state because it does not mandate a national mini-
mum drinking age. Rather, it merely encourages such a change by
conditioning distribution of federal highway funds upon adoption
of a minimum drinking age.
A second interpretation of section 2 is that it merely permits
states that wish to remain "dry" to do so.10 2 In light of the limited
scope of the amendment as defined by the Court, the second inter-
pretation is more cogent. The Supreme Court has noted that "im-
portant federal interests in liquor matters survived the ratification
of the Twenty-first Amendment."103 The Court has held that the
federal government retains authority to regulate interstate com-
merce in liquor'" as well as to control liquor shipments to and
from federal enclaves. 0 5 Additionally, the Court has defined the
amendment as creating an exception to the normal operation of
the commerce clause and stated that its relevance to other consti-
tutional provisions is "increasingly doubtful."10'
A second possible line of attack on the federal legislation is that
it constitutes an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the
tenth amendment by in effect requiring states to adopt a minimum
drinking age of twenty-one.107 However this argument encounters
two difficulties. First, the legislation is not mandatory. A state may
forego a percentage of its federal highway funds if it desires to re-
tain a minimum drinking age of less than twenty-one. Courts have
frequently upheld such use of the spending power when Congress
attempts to achieve broad policy objectives.108
A second difficulty with this argument lies in the Court's recent
interpretation of the tenth amendment in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.' 9 Although the Court in Garcia
was dealing with the tenth amendment in terms of its limitation on
the commerce clause, implications arise in relation to the spending
power because of its similarly broad scope. The Court stated that
102. Id.
103. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminium, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 108
(1980).
104. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694, 2707 (1984).
105. United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 (1973); Collins v. Yosemite Park
& Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
106. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976).
107. See 130 CONG. REC. S8213 (June 26, 1984) (comments of Sen. Baucus).
108. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
109. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). See generally Comment, National League of Cities Over-
ruled-Supreme Court Rejects Tenth Amendment As An Affirmative Limitation On Con-
gress' Power Under The Commerce Clause, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 277 (1985).
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the "principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is
that inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints
that our system provides through state participation in federal
governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that
unduly burden the States will not be promulgated. '" 110 In light of
this interpretation, a tenth amendment challenge to the federal
legislation is not likely to succeed.
D. Antidiscrimination Provision
The antidiscrimination provision adopted by the Florida Legisla-
ture is broader in scope than the amendment originally proposed
in the House and more narrow than the amendment originally pro-
posed in the Senate. The Act provides that a retail beverage estab-
lishment open to the public may not discriminate in service on the
basis of race, creed, color, religion, sex, national origin, marital sta-
tus, or physical handicap.11 The original House amendment pro-
vided that refusal of service must not be in violation of article I,
section 2 of the Florida Constitution.112 The original Senate
amendment applied to all persons licensed under the Florida bev-
erage laws and would thus have included private clubs."1 Further,
the original Senate amendment would have applied to withholding
of "membership, facilities, and service. '
The antidiscrimination provision of the Florida drinking age Act
may be amended as early as the 1986 Regular Session. Senate Bill
1 (1986), containing the provisions of Senator Gordon's original an-
tidiscrimination amendment, has been prefiled with the legisla-
ture. 1 The bill, with twenty-six named sponsors, has broad sup-
port in the Senate. Although a majority of House members were
not receptive to the provision in the 1985 Regular Session, this
may have resulted from pressure to keep the legislation as uncon-
troversial as possible in order for it to pass. The absence of this
110. Id. at 1020.
111. Ch. 85-285, § 4, 1985 Fla. Laws 1798, 1800 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 562.51).
112. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 388 (Reg. Sess. May 16, 1985). FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides in
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pressure may result in increased support for the provision in the
1986 Regular Session. However, lobbyists for groups opposed to
the bill will have considerable time to organize their efforts.
V. CONCLUSION
Two significant factors contributed to the Florida Legislature's
passage of the drinking age bill. The first was federal pressure to
raise the drinking age, which Florida would have felt through with-
holding of highway funds. The second was mounting public con-
cern about the number of alcohol-related traffic accidents. Al-
though the primary aim of the drinking age legislation was to
reduce accidents, it is difficult to predict how effective the legisla-
tion will be in meeting this goal. Studies of states that have raised
their drinking ages have reached inconsistent conclusions. In addi-
tion, ascertainment of the effect of Florida's drinking age bill may
be further obscured by some nineteen and twenty-year-olds' being
able to purchase alcohol. Notwithstanding the legislature's concern
about complying with federal pressure to raise the drinking age,
two features of the drinking age bill may conflict with the federal
law: the exemption for certain military personnel and the grandfa-
ther clause.
Florida's new law contains a provision which allows the drinking
age to revert to nineteen if a federal court of last resort determines
that Congress may not constitutionally withhold funds from states
that do not raise their drinking age to twenty-one. However, it is
unlikely that the federal law will be overturned. Due to broad sup-
port in the Florida Senate for a stronger antidiscrimination provi-
sion, the legislature is likely to revisit the new law in the near
future.
While opponents and supporters of an increased drinking age
disagree as to the effects of the change in the law, all agree that it
is not a complete solution to the problem of drunk driving. The
problem is societal, and every age group contributes to it. A subtle
danger exists in focusing concern merely on the drinking age in
that raising the drinking age may be viewed as a panacea. Now
that the goal of raising the drinking age in an attempt to comply
with federal law has been accomplished, lawmakers should not be
lulled into complacency, but rather should be encouraged to work
for more practical, far-reaching solutions to the problem of drunk
driving.
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